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In-group/out-group distinctions—neuroscience findings and
upshot
Dr. Emile Bruneau
For many, the U.S. is viewed as “the enemy.” Obviously, safeguarding
American lives requires addressing two components of threat from people
who hold this view: decreasing their capability to do harm, and decreasing
their motivation to do harm. While compromising an “enemy group’s” capability to harm the U.S. falls largely outside of the purview of social science, understanding and addressing the motivations behind violent aggression falls squarely in the realm of social psychology. Much research in
social psychology has focused on more innocuous forms of intergroup conflict between arbitrarily assigned groups, or between ethnic groups in multicultural societies. Many (but not all) of the insights from these studies
join an emerging focus specifically on the psychological biases affecting
conflict groups to provide some guidelines for recognizing and addressing
the root motivations of political violence.
Some of the forces driving conflict and inhibiting reconciliation are clear
and tangible: competition for limited resources, a history of violence, and
differences in cultural and religious beliefs. Inter-group antagonism and
political violence can clearly be motivated by such factors: a young man
might be motivated to commit an act of violence against the U.S. because
his relative was killed by a drone strike; because he believes that his land
or resources are being stolen; because he sees his cultural or religious beliefs threatened. Accompanying these socio-political factors is a collection
of psychological factors that can also motivate hostility. The same young
man could be tipped towards violence, for example, by extreme empathy
for the suffering of in-group members, and lack of empathy for out-group
members; because he views Americans as untrustworthy or irrational; because he views American motivations as unworthy rationalizations rather
than reasonable justifications. These psychological biases can be just as
potent as political factors in motivating intergroup aggression.
In this paper, we highlight examples of “hot” and “cold” psychological biases that help drive intergroup hostility and prevent the resolution of intractable conflicts, suggest how these biases can (and cannot) be reduced
with positive interventions, and highlight the potential lessons for people
tasked with safeguarding American national security.
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Psychological biases

3.5.1.1 Empathy
Much of the time, we feel pain or sadness in response to another’s suffering. A key component of this response is the suite of cognitive and affective
capacities called empathy (Batson 2009): people recognize emotional experiences in others, experience matched sensations and emotions, and are
motivated to alleviate the others’ suffering, which frequently results in
helping behaviors.
Empathy is a central pillar of modern human society: it serves simultaneously as “gas” for pro-social behavior (e.g., helping), and a “brake” on antisocial behavior (e.g., aggression). From a young age, typical people are affected by another's suffering: they “step into the other person’s shoes,”
“feel their pain,” and are motivated to help (Batson 2009). At other times,
however, they feel (and do) nothing at all. This flexibility is another hallmark of human empathy. The lighter side of this ability is prominently
displayed in professions that require frequent exposure to human suffering (doctors, nurses, social workers, and aid workers). Empathic regulation also allows us to make everyday decisions that require increasing others’ (short-term) suffering for a greater good (e.g., preventing a child from
playing with something that is dangerous to them, firing an ill-qualified
employee, making a battlefield decision).
The darker side of empathic flexibility is often displayed in the context of
intergroup relations. When an out-group is perceived as antagonistic, people respond less empathically to out-group members, but also more empathically to in-group members (Dovidio et al. 2010). It has been suggested that the motivation to help in-group members, and hostility toward
people from other ethnic or racial groups, may have co-evolved in humans:
group survival is more likely when many members are willing to fight in
inter-group wars and even sacrifice themselves to protect others in their
group (Choi and Bowles 2007). The most dramatic incidents of intergroup
violence are consistent with these suggestions: most suicide bombers are
not psychopaths, but rather may experience “parochial altruism,” or high
empathy selectively for their own group’s suffering (Ginges et al. 2007).
This suggests that the most useful metric of empathy for understanding
political violence may be the gap between in-group empathy and outgroup empathy, for which humans may have a particular susceptibility.
We call this the “intergroup empathy bias.”
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As empathy is such a fundamental psychological force, and is so dramatically affected by group identity, it is important to understand the root
causes and consequences of group-based empathy. One of the “cleaner”
ways to study the intergroup empathy bias (outside of the complexities of
historical violence, ethnic rivalry, and religious differences) is to examine
the effect in minimal groups—groups in which the boundary is arbitrary
(e.g., red team and blue team). Children randomly assigned to color teams
show greater empathy for in-group members than for out-group members
when those children are socially rejected (Masten et al. 2010). Recent work
in our lab with adults has shown that intergroup empathy biases (how bad
and how good participants report feeling in response to in-group and outgroup fortunes and misfortunes) are determined less by self-reported trait
empathy, and more by how strongly group members identify with their
own group relative to the other group. That is, the most dramatic differences in intergroup empathy bias (which characterize many people who
commit acts of extreme violence) are better predicted by tribalism than
sociopathy.
The intergroup empathy bias is established rapidly and difficult to shake;
however, two methods are successful at decreasing this bias. In one version of our study, we provided one group of participants with a graphical
representation of the in-group and out-group that presented them as overlapping networks of individuals, and another group with graphical representations of the in-group and out-group that presented them as distinct
networks of individuals. Everything else about the study was identical in
both conditions. Although both representations were bogus (and meaningless), the intergroup empathy bias was significantly decreased when
groups were represented as more integrated and overlapping. Therefore,
the mere perception of intergroup similarity or overlap can mitigate the
intergroup empathy bias.
In another version of the study, we examined how framing the information
affected the intergroup empathy bias. In this version, one group of participants was presented with “headlines” of in-group and out-group members’
fortunes/misfortunes, and another group was presented with the headlines embedded in a short narrative about each protagonist. We found that
including the narrative significantly decreased the intergroup empathy bias by drawing participants’ attention away from group membership and
towards individual experiences.
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Characterizing the boundary conditions of the narratives (i.e., what types
of information or style of narratives generate the greatest effect), and determining how effective these mitigating factors are in the context of real
intergroup conflict is currently being investigated. However, these initial
results suggest that the framing of the groups and the information can
dramatically alter the intergroup empathy bias.
3.5.1.2 Reasoning
The combination of enhanced in-group empathy and failed out-group empathy may provide a “hot,” emotional motivation for political violence. At
the same time, a group of “cold,” and seemingly more rational, biases may
also drive hostility.
Humans are “naïve realists,” believing that they have an objective view of
reality (Ross and Ward 1994, 1996). This creates a problem when we encounter disagreement with another. Naive realism predicts that people
first assume that the other person lacks the correct perspective on the issues—“If only they knew what I knew, they would agree with me.” However, when simple exchange of information fails to resolve the disagreement,
people quickly switch to the interpretation that the other person or group
is inherently biased and irrational. For example, in a disagreement among
students over academic policy, each side is more likely to ascribe “valid”
reasons over “biasing” reasons for their own position, but “biasing” reasons over “valid” reasons for the student they disagree with (Pronin et al.
2004). This effect has also been demonstrated at the group level: when
asked about their views of the conflict in the Middle East, Jewish and Arab
American respondents each report that their own identities provide insights on the issues, while the others’ identity confers bias (Ehrlinger et al.
2005).
The greater the divide in opinion is, the more people assume that another’s
views are based on non-normative factors like bias and ideology. The perception of out-group bias is thus exacerbated by another psychological bias: partisans tend to over-estimate their disagreements with the other
group. This “false polarization bias” acts at the group level, amplifying the
perception of disagreement between groups beyond the actual levels of
disagreement, specifically for one’s most strongly held views (Chambers et
al. 2006; Robinson et al. 1995).
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The perception of out-group bias can fuel political violence. Perceiving the
other as biased makes people less willing to cooperate or negotiate with
the other side, and more inclined towards aggressive or competitive actions, like sanctions or shows of force (Kennedy and Pronin 2008). This
has been hypothesized to lead to a “perception of bias-conflict spiral.” The
first side sees the group differences as amplified, and differences in opinion are perceived as wider than they are; these differences in opinion accentuate the perception of the second side’s views as biased and irrational;
seeing the second side as biased leads the first side to choose conflictescalating behaviors and reduce the tendency towards rational negotiation; these actions reinforce the second side’s perception of the first side as
irrational and biased, thus continuing the cycle. Altogether, this spiral of
psychological effects drives partisans towards more adversarial options
such as political violence.
If empathy biases and naïve realism are a consequence of the human condition, and these psychological biases are present at the interpersonal as
well as intergroup levels, is there any way to get past them? Although the
vast majority of work on cognitive biases has been devoted to categorizing
and describing them, the few studies that have attempted to ascertain how
stable these biases are over time provide some tentative hope. For example, our own work (described below) has shown that, given the right intervention conditions, empathy biases and higher level cognitive biases can
be altered between different cultural groups (Americans and Mexican immigrants), and even groups embroiled in intractable conflict (Israelis and
Palestinians).
3.5.2

Conflict resolution interventions

When two groups are in conflict, prejudice, discrimination, and open hostility can thrive. Each group’s perception of the other is characterized by
failures of empathy and perceptions of bias. Conflict resolution and prejudice-reduction programs aim to turn this situation around by using several
types of interventions: perspective-taking, role playing, simulation, and
positive intergroup contact. The general hypothesis of these programs is
that improving attitudes for specific out-group members can enhance attitudes towards the out-group as a whole, thus engendering a willingness to
help and reluctance to harm out-group members.
Understanding the causes and contexts of interventions, and the short and
long-term effects of interventions on both groups, is critical to better un-
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derstanding the positive effects and unintended consequences of conflict
resolution efforts. Unfortunately, well-controlled empirical studies of
prejudice-reduction and conflict resolution programs remain rare, and relevant data are scarce (Paluck and Green 2009). There are a handful of
documented successful interventions. For example, Chileans’ empathy towards native Mapuche, and Bosnian Serbs’ empathy towards Bosnian
Muslims, was increased by perspective-taking (Čehajić et al. 2009). In an
impressive large-scale field study, a radio drama in Rwanda depicting positive intergroup interactions increased empathy of Hutus towards Tutsis
(Paluck 2009). A conflict resolution program in Sri Lanka demonstrated
that the positive effects of interventions can be long-lasting: relative to
control groups, Singhalese participants in a 4-day intergroup workshop
expressed enhanced empathy towards Tamils, even a year after participating in the program (Malhotra and Liyanage 2005). Another study conducted by our lab in the Middle East illustrated that positive effects from
interventions can act very rapidly, improving attitudes of Israeli and Palestinian participants for each other even after a 20-minute interaction with
an out-group member (Bruneau and Saxe 2012). Furthermore, increased
empathy can lead to improved attitudes towards, and willingness to help
the out-group (Batson et al. 1997; Hodson 2008; Pettigrew and Tropp
2008). For example, increasing empathy increased donations to an outgroup charity (Malhotra and Liyanage 2005), and forgiveness for past
atrocities (Cehajic et al. 2008).
However, perhaps more striking than the handful of successes is the
dearth of successful interventions. In fact, while success is possible, interventions designed to improve intergroup attitudes are often ineffective,
and empathy, positive attitudes, and helpful intentions toward an outgroup can also decrease following perspective-taking. For example,
metastereotypes—thoughts about how one (as a majority group member)
may be evaluated by an out-group member—are activated when individuals empathize with an out-group member in the context of an intergroup
interaction. These thoughts have the deleterious effect of interrupting other-focused empathic responses that are required for prejudice reduction.
Moreover, among relatively high-prejudice participants, empathyinduction can elicit overtly negative reactions to a nearby out-group
member (Vorauer and Sasaki 2009).
Intergroup interventions can also fail for one of the groups involved. A meta-analysis of conflict resolution programs based on the “Contact Hypoth-
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esis” found that, although the programs generally improve attitudes of the
majority group towards the minority group, they are ineffective for improving attitudes of minority group members towards the majority group
(Tropp and Pettigrew 2005). Similarly, an intervention in the Middle East
fashioned after Sesame Street was generally successful at improving attitudes of Israelis towards Palestinians, but not the other way around (Cole
et al. 2003). This raises the possibility that interventions may interact with
group membership to produce asymmetric effects. There is ample anecdotal evidence, and some longitudinal data (Hammack 2011), to suggest that
attitudes of disempowered group members may even get worse over time,
as they return from their intergroup encounter with trust and hope to find
structural inequality intact. Generating temporary intergroup trust may
therefore provide a short-term gain that sets up the potential for a negative
rebound. Although the idea that asymmetric power may interact with interventions has received little attention, recent studies have supported this
notion. For example, a more “assimilationist” orientation more effectively
predicts positive interracial orientations among majority group members,
while “integration” representations are more effective at predicting positive interracial orientations among minority group members (Dovidio et
al. 2001; Van Oudenhoven et al. 1998; Verkuyten and Brug 2004).
Our own work shows an asymmetric effect of intervention type on attitudes of Israelis and Palestinians towards each other. In a study conducted
simultaneously in Tel Aviv and Ramallah, Israelis and Palestinians were
exposed to a member of the other group in a surprise, on-line interaction
in which they either wrote about “one or two of the most difficult aspects
of life in [their] country” (“perspective-giving”), or read what a member of
the other group wrote about this topic, summarizing that view at the end
(“perspective-taking”). We found that Israeli biases towards Palestinians
significantly changed only in the perspective-taking condition, and Palestinian biases towards Israelis significantly changed only in the perspectivegiving condition (Bruneau and Saxe 2012). This pattern was replicated in
Arizona when the same study was conducted with Mexican immigrants
and white Arizonans, suggesting that the effectiveness of the interaction
depends upon group power. Two pieces of evidence suggest that the benefits for Palestinians in the perspective-giving condition were not due only
to speaking, but hinged critically on feeling “heard”: first, the amount of
positive change was correlated with how well they felt their Israeli partner
summarized what they had said (and was independent of how sympathetic
they felt their interaction partner was), and second, there was no change in
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intergroup bias following a control condition where Palestinians wrote
about the same topic, but had no interaction partner.
3.5.3

Potential applications of social science

One of the challenges faced by the U.S. is how to decrease anti-American
sentiment and prevent violent attacks on U.S. citizens. Here we have highlighted a couple of psychological forces, both “hot” and “cold,” that could
drive an individual towards violence: an intergroup empathy gap (simultaneously providing the “gas” to protect your group, and relieving the
“brake” to aggress against the “other”) and a perception of out-group irrationality based on naïve realism. We have also examined a number of conflict resolution efforts, both by social scientists and private organizations,
that have tried to address intergroup biases. The successes and failures of
experimental manipulations and conflict resolution efforts provide useful
lessons for people hoping to improve attitudes of others towards the U.S.
3.5.3.1 Framing can mitigate intergroup biases
Increasing the perception of group similarity can lessen both “hot” and
“cold” intergroup biases. This frame can even be established by essentially
meaningless graphical representations. Framing information about group
members in short narratives also decreases the intergroup empathy bias;
the effect of narrative framing on “cold” cognitive biases has not yet been
examined.
3.5.3.2 It is dangerous to rely on one’s own (or one’s group’s) intuitions
regarding possible interventions for another group
The past research on conflict resolution programs reviewed here suggests
that these efforts are often unproductive or even counter-productive, particularly for the disempowered group members. Formal conflict resolution
programs are generally started by extremely well meaning members of the
empowered group; social scientists are predominantly white males. It is
possible that the intuitions brought by these people selectively serve the
psychological needs only of the empowered group, often with the unintended consequence of driving the disempowered group even further
away.
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3.5.3.3 When engaging across group boundaries, it matters who speaks (and
whether they perceive that they were heard)
A recent audit of dialogue programs in Israel found that the less Palestinians spoke (relative to Israelis), the less effective the program was for the
Palestinian participants (Hammack 2011). Our work suggests that this effect is causal: members of the relatively disempowered groups benefit
most when they are given the opportunity to speak (and feel heard). People who perceive the U.S. as their “enemy out-group” may therefore benefit from being given a forum to speak, as long as the listener is able to
make them feel understood (but not necessarily agreed with). This also
suggests that members of the most disempowered group should be given
the floor first during negotiations.
3.5.4

Summary

The psychological edifice erected between group members, often without
their conscious awareness, combines with socio-political barriers to drive
members of conflict groups towards aggressive intergroup behaviors and
away from intergroup reconciliation. Crucially, group membership interacts with these psychological forces, potentially rendering uniform interventions less effective for one of the groups; in some conditions, well
meaning interventions aimed at decreasing intergroup hostilities can even
have an ironic effect.
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3.6

Neurobiology of sacred values and implications for radicalization
process
Dr. Greg Berns
3.6.1

Introduction

Beliefs are components of the brain’s model of the world within which it
resides. Beliefs help interpret states of the world, formulate predictions of
events of the world, and influence courses of action to take or not take in
response to those interpretations and predictions. Consequently, knowing
the beliefs held by others can inform estimates, and explanations, of actions (or reactions) based on those beliefs (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010).
However, as beliefs vary widely across contexts and content, all beliefs are
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